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The Interplay Between Intellectual
Property Rights and Free Movement of
Goods in the European Communityt
Roger J. Goebel*
Professor Hansen mentioned when he was speaking earlier that
it's desirable to get back to basics when we look at European Eco-
nomic Community ("EEC") intellectual property law. That is the
core of what I am going to talk about: the interplay between intel-
lectual property rights and free movement of goods.
Free movement of goods is, as you are undoubtedly aware, one
of the fundamental principles of the European Community ("Com-
munity").
This is in contrast-in vivid contrast, I might say-with our
Constitution's Commerce Clause, which is not a goal but merely
a power clause. Hence, not surprisingly, Community law has gone
further in the removal of barriers to trade than we have in the Unit-
ed States. The United States Supreme Court, on several occasions,
has recognized that the Congress may limit trade and permit states
to have obstacles to trade, which would not be permitted in the
European Community. States may even discriminate against out-
of-state products and out-of-state suppliers of services if the Con-
gress permits. That would not be possible in the Community be-
cause it hinders the achievement of a positive goal.
In recent years, this positive goal of free movement of goods
has been reinforced by the program of Completing the Internal
Market by 1992, first outlined in the Commission of the European
t This panel commentary was presented at the Fordham Conference on International
Intellectual Property Law and Policy held at Fordham University School of Law on April
15-16, 1993.
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Communities ("Commission") White Paper of June 1985,1 and by
the Single European Act's introduction of Article 8a, which set a
deadline of December 31, 1992, for the removal of barriers to
trade.2
In order to achieve that, however, one must attempt to remove
the barriers to trade permitted in Article 36 of the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community3 ("EEC Treaty"), supple-
mented to some extent by the doctrine of the European Court of
Justice in Cassis de Dijon,4 which allows other areas of important
state concern to limit the movement of goods-such areas include
environmental concerns, consumer rights protection and the like.
Hence, the Commission and the Council of Ministers ("Council")
have undertaken an extremely aggressive program of harmonization
of Member State rules which protect these State interests in order
to set Community-wide rules.
How does this interrelate to intellectual property?
The first point is that the harmonization of intellectual proper-
ty-or the creation of intellectual property rights-is not a specific
goal of the EEC Treaty. It was not included in the initial Articles
2 or 3; it was not added by the Single European Act, which added
environmental concerns as an area of Treaty activity; and it was
not added by the Maastricht Treaty, 5 which added education, health,
and culture as areas of concern for legislative action. It has be-
come, however, a part of the harmonization program because intel-
lectual property rights are a limit to the movement of goods under
Article 36, which specifically allows industrial and commercial
property rights to limit the free movement of goods. So it has
1. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85)310 final.
2. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741. The Single
European Act ("SEA") constitutes a series of important amendments to the European Eco-
nomic Community Treaty, infra note 3. The SEA entered into effect on July 1, 1987.
3. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (1958), amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741.
4. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverualtung ffir Branntwein, Case 120/78,
[1979] E.C.R. 649.
5. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), (1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
719.
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come in, if you will, through the back door.
That has always been recognized in the Community. In the
White Paper of June 1985, the Commission stated that, "Differ-
ences in intellectual property laws have a direct and negative im-
pact on inter-Community trade and on the ability of enterprises to
treat the Common Market as a single environment for their eco-
nomic activities." That, therefore, is the justification for a program
to try to eliminate the diversities of intellectual property law.
The necessity for this harmonization program-or the creation
of Community-wide rights, which is the alternative approach used
in the Community Patent Convention6 and the draft Community
Trademark Regulation7 -has been reinforced by the European
Court of Justice's doctrines.
The Court of Justice is an extremely -active player in the inte-
gration of the Community's market. The Court of Justice has,
generally speaking, interpreted Article 36's limitations on the free
movement of goods rather strictly. In the area of health and safety,
for example, it has developed doctrines which require Member
States to justify their interference with the free movement of goods,
and it has introduced doctrines of proportionality which state that
the Member States' measures must be strictly limited to what is
necessary to protect the State interest involved.
Somewhat surprisingly, in the field of intellectual property
rights, the Court has not been active to any great extent, with the
exception of the exhaustion doctrine that I'll turn to in a moment.
Instead, its record has been one of great deference to national
rights. Indeed, the term in the Treaty is "industrial and commercial
property rights," and one could argue that copyright should not be
deemed an industrial and commercial property right. It is more
properly termed an intellectual property right or an artistic and
literary right.
The Court of Justice fairly early on did not accept that interpre-
6. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975,
Luxembourg, 15 I.L.M. 5.
7. Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Trade Mark, EuR.
PARL. DOC. EEC(91)4595 draft (PI 10).
1993]
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tation. In the Deutsche Grammophon8 case, and later in Coditel9
and GEMA,' ° the Court followed the Advocate-General's sugges-
tion that the term "industrial and commercial property rights"
should be read broadly and should include artistic and literary
rights under copyright. I don't think that's particularly surprising
because I believe, even in 1957, that the term "industrial and com-
mercial property rights" in France-French was presumably the
initial drafting language--could be read broadly enough to include
copyrights.
Perhaps more surprising is that, in other areas, the Court gener-
ally has deferred to the national law in its recognition of types of
intellectual property rights in their extent and in their modes of
creation and protection.
In the outline that I prepared I have indicated some of the lead-
ing cases: Nancy Kean Gifts," where the Court recognized nation-
al trade design rights for handbags; E.M.L Electrola v. Patricia,2
where the Court recognized that a longer period of copyright in
Germany was an effective means to prohibit goods coming in from
a state where the copyright had expired; Thetford v. Fiamma,13
where the Court allowed the U.K. to have a rather peculiar relative
novelty patent as a legitimate form of patent; Warner Bros. v.
Christiansen,14 where the Court allowed Denmark's creation of
rental rights as a form of copyright to reinstate or resurrect the
8. Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-GrolmArkte GmbH & Co.
KG, Case 78/70, [1971] E.C.R. 487, [1971] 10 C.M.L.R. 631.
9. S.A. Compagnie Gdndral pour la Diffusion de la Tldvision v. Cin6 Vog Films,
Case 62/79, [1980] E.C.R. 881, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 362; Coditel S.A. v. Cind-Vog Films
S.A., Case 262/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3381, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 49.
10. Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. Gesellschaft Fur Musikalische Auffuhrungs
und Mechanische Verviel-Faligungsrechte (GEMA), Case 55/180, [1981] E.C.R. 147,
[1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 44.
11. Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, Case 144/81, [1982] E.C.R. 2853, [1983]
2 C.M.L.R. 47.
12. E.M.I. Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und Export, Case 341/87, [19891 E.C.R.
79, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 413.
13. Thetford Corp. v. Fiamma SpA, Case 35/87, [1988] E.C.R. 3585, [1988] 3
C.M.L.R. 549.
14. Warner Bros. v. Christiansen, Case 158/86, [1988] E.C.R. 2605, [1990] 3
C.M.L.R. 684.
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right of an initial copyright owner who had sold the product in the
U.K.; and Terrapin v. Terranova,15 which allowed Germany to
maintain and utilize its doctrine of trademark confusion to bar a
British company from using a traditional British trademark in Ger-
many.
The important point to note is that in all of those cases the
counter-arguments were invariably either that the nature of the right
is rather peculiar in the Member State, and therefore should not be
considered to qualify under Article 36; or that the Court should
construe Article 36 more narrowly.
Thus, for example, in the Thetford case, the case of the British
relative novelty patent, the argument was made that, the Court
should recognize the patent but require a compulsory license, so
that the outsider, the importer into the U.K., could still compete.
The Court would not adopt that approach.
In the Warner Bros. case, which was, to some degree, the cata-
lyst for the Rental Rights Directive, 16 the argument made and ac-
cepted by Advocate-General Mancini was an exhaustion of rights
approach; namely, that since the British product-the tape of the
James Bond movie, Never Say Never Again-had been sold in the
United Kingdom, it would be inappropriate to allow Denmark sud-
denly to grant new rights to the owner of the copyright when the
economic exploitation right had been exhausted by the product's
initial sale in the United Kingdom. Under the exhaustion doctrine,
once a product has been sold with the owner's consent, the right of
the owner, generally speaking, elapses. 7 But the Court denied
such reasoning and recognized the Danish right as a form of copy-
right and, hence, appropriate as a limitation.
15. Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kapfere & Co., Case
119/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1039, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 482.
16. Council Directive of 19 November 1992 on Rental Right and Lending Right and
on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in the Field of Intellectual Property, 921100/EEC,
O.J. L 346/61 (1992).
17. Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, Case 16/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 480; Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. Gesellschaft Fur Musikalische
Auffuhrungs und Mechanische Verviel-Faligungsrechte (GEMA), Case 55/180, [1981]
E.C.R. 147, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 44.
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The net effect of the Court's higher level of deference, of
course, is that the Community is partitioned by intellectual property
rights. Thus arises the necessity for the Commission to propose
and the Council to adopt a number of the Directives about which
we have been hearing today. If the Court had taken a different ap-
proach to those cases, that necessity would have been diminished
because the goal of Community harmonization is the removal of
barriers to trade.
Now, the final point I would like to make-and I think that I
can't make it at any length-is that even though the Community
program's goal is to remove the barriers to trade, particularly in the
area of copyright as Dr. Verstrynge has noted, the Community has
gone a bit beyond its goal by recognizing additional social and
cultural features of interest that it wants to see promoted through
the particular Directives.
That, particularly to common law lawyers, either may seem to
violate the principle of subsidiarity or to go beyond the Communi-
ty's brief, which merely is to remove the barriers to trade. I don't
have time to go into this now, but we might be able to go into it
in the question period.
I think that, as an outside observer, one can have some serious
questions as to whether it is absolutely necessary to adopt some
features of the Directives that have already been adopted or that are
proposed-in particular, the directive on moral rights-simply to
remove barriers to trade.
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